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The Conditions for Functional Mechanisms of Compensation and
Reward for Environmental Services
Brent M. Swallow 1, Beria Leimona 2, Thomas Yatich 2, and Sandra J. Velarde 2
ABSTRACT. Mechanisms of compensation and reward for environmental services (CRES) are becoming
increasingly contemplated as means for managing human–environment interactions. Most of the functional
mechanisms in the tropics have been developed within the last 15 years; many developing countries still
have had little experience with functional mechanisms. We consider the conditions that foster the origin
and implementation of functional mechanisms. Deductive and inductive approaches are combined. Eight
hypotheses are derived from theories of institution and policy change. Five case studies, from Latin America,
Africa, and Asia, are then reviewed according to a common framework. The results suggest the following
to be important conditions for functional CRES mechanisms: (1) localized scarcity for particular
environmental services, (2) influence from international environmental agreements and international
organizations, (3) government policies and public attitudes favoring a mixture of regulatory and market-
based instruments, and (4) security of individual and group property rights.
Key Words: carbon sequestration; ecosystem services; ecotourism; environmental services; institutional
change; payments for environmental services; watershed services
INTRODUCTION
Current patterns of human–environment interaction
are straining the world's ecosystems. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) concluded
that most terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems have
already suffered major degradation and that
ecosystem degradation is evident in both
industrialized and less-developed countries. Many
types of economic activity and production are
degrading the environment: agrarian economies are
more prone to declines in soil fertility and
sedimentation of waterways, deforestation is the
major source of greenhouse gas emissions in the
humid tropics, and many industrialized economies
are beset by problems like air pollution and nitrate
loading of waterways.
Over time, human societies have developed
institutional arrangements to manage ecosystems at
the local, national, and global levels. For the most
part, these institutions focus on regulation of
individual behavior, protecting public rights to
particular resources or ecosystems, and undertaking
collective investment in infrastructure to enhance
human capture of ecosystem services. An
alternative approach that is gaining prominence in
many parts of the world is compensation and reward
for environmental services (CRES). As described
by Swallow et al. (2009), we use the "CRES" to refer
to voluntary and conditional agreements that are
negotiated among ecosystem stewards, beneficiaries
of environmental services, and intermediaries.
CRES mechanisms may or may not involve
conditional transfers of money from beneficiaries
to stewards. CRES mechanisms can be
complementary to traditional regulatory approaches,
provided that the regulations provide scope for
negotiation and agreements among specific groups
of ecosystem stewards, intermediaries, and
beneficiaries of environmental services.
As part of a pan-tropical scoping study, we present
a series of hypotheses about conditions affecting the
initiation and operation of functional mechanisms
of CRES. We use both inductive and deductive
research approaches. The deductive approach
considers CRES mechanisms as institutional and
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policy innovations. Theories of institutional change
and policy diffusion are used to identify conditions
under which CRES mechanisms are likely to
emerge and become functional. The inductive
approach presents a description of case studies of
functional CRES mechanisms operating in specific
contexts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The
case studies are summarized briefly, with emphasis
on conditions affecting origin and function.
The pan-tropical approach allows us to draw lessons
from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The focus is
on the development and early implementation of
functional mechanisms; all of the case studies are
at relatively early stages of implementation,
providing scant opportunity to assess their
environmental performance or sustainability.
Readers interested in performance issues are
referred to studies of the CRES mechanisms in
Central America that have been in place for longer
periods of time (Pagiola et al. 2005, Sanchez-
Azofeifa et al. 2007, Wunder and Alban 2008). A
global review of the state of markets and payments
for environmental services is provided by the Food
and Agricultural Organization (2007).
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A number of theories of institutional and policy
change are articulated in the economics and political
science literature. In this section, we briefly review
some of the major theories in order to develop
hypotheses about factors likely to shape the origin
and function of CRES mechanisms. The theories
highlight the role of particular causal factors but are
not mutually exclusive. Indeed, multiple causal
factors are likely to influence any particular case.
Demsetz (1967) was one of the first neoclassical
economists to study institutional change,
assembling the elements of a demand-driven theory
of institutional change. Central to that theory is the
concept of externality that was first developed by
Pigou (1920): the effects of an economic transaction
by a party or parties on a third party. The demand-
driven theory of institutional change postulates that
societies will develop new institutions when there
is sufficient need to internalize externalities from
each other's use of resources, with need changing in
response to changes in scarcity of inputs, available
technologies, and output markets. The theory is
often applied to explain changes in property rights
but has been applied to other change processes,
including economic growth (Nelson and Winter
1982), regulation (Peltzman 1976), and organization
of economic functions (Grossman and Hart 1986).
The theory supports the following hypotheses about
the conditions for functional CRES mechanisms.
H1. Increased scarcities of environmental services,
due to population growth, demographic shifts, and/
or degradation of ecosystems, will prompt increased
demand for restoring and protecting ecosystems,
which in turn will prompt greater demand for secure
property rights to environmental services.
H2. New market opportunities for selling
environmental services or outputs generated by
those services will prompt increased demand for
environmental services, new demand for compensation
for resulting damage to ecosystems, and thus new
demand for CRES institutions.
H3. The availability of profitable new technologies
for using environmental services to generate
economic output will increase demand for
environmental services and CRES mechanisms.
The model of demand-driven institutional change
is based on a number of simplifying assumptions
about the institutional change process. North's
(1994) interest group model of institutional change
relaxes some of those assumptions, explicitly
recognizing the following: (1) economic agents tend
to coalesce into interest groups to further their
interests, and (2) institutional change is a costly
process for both individuals and society.
Institutional change is therefore highly path-
dependent, with institutions in one period having
great influence on institutions prevailing in
subsequent periods. The interest group model
supports additional hypotheses about the drivers of
CRES institutions.
H4. The development of CRES mechanisms occurs
in the context of an array of rural institutions and
organizations, many of which directly affect the
formation of interest groups, transaction costs, and
the process by which public choices are made. Self-
organized interest groups will tend to exclude the
poorest and most vulnerable members of society.
Organizations that serve as intermediaries between
ecosystem stewards and beneficiaries have their
own interests, which may or may not align with one
or another de facto interest group of ecosystem
stewards or ecosystem service beneficiaries.
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Jordan et al. (2003) identify three political science
models of institutional change that may also be
relevant to an analysis of the development and
effectiveness of CRES mechanisms: (1) ideas
dominant, (2) settings dominant, and (3) chaos
dominant.
The ideas dominant model assumes that policy
change occurs as a result of social learning in which
groups of policy actors exert influence over policy
processes to promote instruments consistent with
their ideas or beliefs. Most policy changes occur as
minor changes to existing policies, with occasional
major shifts. The ideas dominant model supports
the following hypotheses.
H5. Functional CRES mechanisms are more likely
to emerge and be functional where market and
property rights institutions are effective and
consistent with common beliefs about the
appropriate form of society.
The settings dominant model proposes that policy
change occurs within a context of entrenched
institutions and power relations. Changes to
environmental policies are generally incremental,
with significant changes occurring only in response
to environmental shocks large enough to
significantly change that context.
H6. CRES mechanisms will only develop as a
response to a significant environmental disaster
associated with ineffectual or inappropriate
previous environmental policies.
The chaos dominant model views the policy process
as unstable because actors operate under conditions
of uncertainty and lack the time for comprehensive
searches for information. Kingdon (1984,
referenced in Jordan et al. 2003) developed a variant
of the chaos dominant model in which the policy
process contains three streams: (1) a stream of
problems demanding policy solution, (2) a stream
of available policies, and (3) a stream of politics
where actors compete for position and resources.
Interactions between the three streams create policy
windows in which a compelling problem opens a
window of opportunity for a specific policy solution
to seize the agenda.
H7. CRES mechanisms may emerge at unexpected
times and situations, and may be strongly associated
with the activities of particular individuals or
organizations that are able to take advantage of
suitable policy windows.
The models of institutional development discussed
above are all based on the assumption that
institutional change is determined within a
particular political context. However, multicountry
studies of environmental policy show remarkable
convergence across countries. This policy
convergence can be partly explained by the
development of multilateral environmental agreements
that place new expectations and demands on
national governments. In addition, it is clear that
there has been rapid diffusion of environmental
policy instruments from frontrunner countries to
others.
The model of policy diffusion presented by Kern et
al. (2001) postulates that countries enact new
environmental laws in response to domestic
pressures and debate, in anticipation of
opportunities for international trade and international
leadership, and as a result of support from
international networks or organizations. Aside from
the desire for international prestige, countries may
want to position themselves as policy frontrunners
in order to take advantage of existing economic
capacity or stimulate the development of new
technologies.
There are a number of international organizations
and networks now supporting the development of
CRES mechanisms. For example, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is a lead organization in reviewing and
assembling best practice on the use of CRES
mechanisms among its member states and beyond
(OECD 2004, 2005). Other organizations providing
support for the development of effective CRES
mechanisms include the World Bank, United
Nations Environment Programme, Forest Trends,
World Agroforestry Centre, International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the World Conservation
Union, International Institute for Environment and
Development, Care International, and the
Worldwide Fund for Nature.
H8. CRES mechanisms are more likely to diffuse
to places where they are well supported by
international organizations and networks.
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REVIEW OF CASE STUDY EVIDENCE
The Pan-tropical Scoping Study of Compensation
for Ecosystem Services included regional
workshops convened in Latin America (Quito,
Ecuador, April 2006), Asia (Bangalore, India, May
2006), and Africa (Nairobi, Kenya, May 2006). The
results of those workshops are summarized in Poats
(2007), Raju et al. (2007), and Ochieng et al. (2007).
A number of specific CRES mechanisms were
presented and discussed at those regional
workshops. This section reviews five case studies,
focusing on conditions that appear to have been
particularly important in shaping the origin and
function of the mechanisms. The following criteria
were used to select the case studies: (1) all cases are
consistent with the Wunder (2005) criteria of PES
and the CRES framework of Swallow et al. (2009);
(2) the cases cover a range of environmental services
and CRES prototypes as described by Swallow et
al. (2009); (3) the cases are novel in their own
national contexts, with several being used as
templates for subsequent CRES development in
those contexts; (4) all cases were operational at the
time that the paper was written, with tangible
exchanges occurring between environmental
service beneficiaries and ecosystem stewards; (5)
the cases illustrate different types of government
involvement; (6) at least one case from each of
Africa, Latin America, and Asia; and (7) the authors
had access to relatively complete information
available on the origin and function of all of the
cases from published and first-hand sources.
The case studies are all presented according to a
common framework: context, origin, function, and
key conditions for origin and function. All of the
case studies were in relatively early stages of
implementation at the time this paper was written,
preventing any conclusive analysis of their long-
term viability.
Case Study 1: Payments for watershed
conservation and restoration in Heredia
municipality of Costa Rica
Context 
The municipality of Heredia is part of the urban area
in the central valley of Costa Rica, across the Virilla
River from San Jose, the capital city. Heredia
municipality obtains water from the Rio Segunda
watershed, which drains an area from the nearby
Barva Volcano into the Virilla River. Heredia
municipality obtains water from a catchment area
of 113 km², 34% of which is covered by forest,
including part of the Braulio Carrillo National Park.
The Heredia public utilities company, Empresa de
Sericios Publicos de Heredia (ESPH), provides
water to about 49,000 households and does not
operate a water treatment facility (Morena 2006,
Barrantes and Gamez 2007, Kosoy et al. 2007,
Pagiola et al. 2007).
Scoping and negotiation 
Concerns about the prospects for maintaining high-
quality water led the ESPH to consider whether to
invest in constructing a water treatment plant or
protecting the watershed with farmers living in the
watershed. ESPH was inspired to develop their Pago
de Servicios Ambientales (PSA) scheme by the
example of New York City–Catskills and was
institutionally supported by Costa Rica's national
program of payments for environmental services
(Postel and Thompson 2005). The Director of ESPH
had previously been involved in the implementation
of Costa Rica's national PES program (Castro et al.
2000).
A hydrologic study of the Rio Segunda watershed
was undertaken. That study identified an area of
about 19 km² as highest priority for forest
conservation and restoration. Economic studies
quantified the opportunity costs of forest
conservation as well as the implementation costs of
forest restoration (Moreno 2006). In 2000, the
ESPH opened a dialogue with landowners in the
priority areas and began raising revenue through an
environmental levy on water consumers. The PSA
scheme began in 2002.
Function 
ESPH agreed to give farmers 10-year contracts for
forest conservation at a rate of $92/ha/year, and 15-
year contracts for forest restoration at a rate of $170/
ha/year. The Heredia municipality began making
contracts in the year 2002 and added new contracts
in 2003, 2004, and 2005. As of January 2007, ESPH
had negotiated 23 contracts to cover an area of 12
km².
Key conditions for origin and function 
 
1. A supportive institutional and policy context
in Costa Rica.
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2. A strong knowledge base to prioritize
investments and base payments.
 
3. A pro-active municipal water company with
a clear business case for investment in
conservation.
Case Study 2: Rewards for watershed services
in the Bakun watershed in the Philippines
Context 
The Bakun watershed is a 310-km² area in the
Cordillera mountains of the northern Philippines
that is the source of water for local communities,
irrigation systems, and two hydropower facilities.
The watershed is the home for the Bago and
Kankana-ey indigenous minority groups. Poverty
levels are high, with about 87% of people living
below the national poverty line (Espaldon 2005,
RUPES Bakun Site Profile: http://www.worldagrof
orestrycentre.org/sea/networks/rupes/download/
SiteProfiles/RUPES-Bakun_FINAL.pdf).
The peculiar colonial history of the Philippines has
shaped the country's institutions for land tenure and
natural resource management, with entrenched
inequities and biases against indigenous groups
living in the upland areas of the country. Policy and
institutional changes that began in the early 1990s
have gradually reduced inequities and given greater
recognition and rights to indigenous people and
upland smallholder farmers. The Philippine
Constitution (1993) instituted state recognition of
land rights of indigenous people, which was further
enhanced by the passage of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act in 1997. The Department of Energy Act
(1992) mandated the establishment of the
Environment Enhancement Fund to compensate
communities for hosting energy generation
facilities. Since 1995, hydropower companies have
been required to direct part of their tax revenue to
the Environment Enhancement Fund.
Scoping and negotiation 
Taking advantage of this new institutional
environment, the Bago and Kankana-ey people of
Bakun organized the Bakun Indigenous Tribes
Organization (BITO) to facilitate their ancestral
domain development and protection efforts. In
2002, the Kankana-ey was the first indigenous
group to obtain a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT), which gives the group formal title to
its ancestral lands.
Following national law, the hydropower companies
operating in the Bakun watershed pay a 2% royalty
into the Environment Enhancement Fund. For
several years, however, use of this fund for actual
environmental protection was minimal. With
support from the RUPES Programme (Rewarding
Upland Poor of Asia for Environmental Services
they provide), BITO facilitated the establishment of
an integrated watershed management program.
Negotiations between BITO and the municipal
government have been aimed at using the portion
of the royalties in the Environmental Enhancement
Fund to support conservation efforts by local
communities. Negotiations with the hydropower
company have been successful in gaining in-kind
payments from the hydropower company, including
(1) diverting only part of the water for the purpose
of hydropower and leaving the other part for local
irrigation and fisheries, (2) granting scholarships to
local students, (3) establishing a tree nursery for
training local farmers in tree planting, (4)
constructing roads, (5) delivering electricity to
nearby villages, and (6) providing a piped water
system. The company also promised to pay
US$10,000 annually to the villages where the
hydropower facility is located as an additional
compensation payment. In addition, the company
provided tree seedlings and hired labor to plant trees
on 144 ha of land.
Conditions determining origin and function
 
1. Valuable environmental services: The
presence of the two hydropower companies
shows the importance of the watershed
services.
 
2. Rights and negotiation context: Empowerment
of indigenous groups in the Philippines has
enhanced the bargaining power of indigenous
people who live in the community.
 
3. Regulatory underpinnings: The Energy
Regulation act ensures that some of the taxes
paid by hydropower companies are
earmarked for catchment conservation.
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4. Political will: The municipal government is
willing to allocate a portion of royalties from
the general municipality budget to the Bakun
people for watershed management, although
the final allocation of those funds is yet to be
agreed.
 
5. Role of policy support networks: Bakun is
one of six core sites in the RUPES program.
Case Study 3: Direct payments as a mechanism
for conserving a wildlife corridor in the
Kitengela area of Kenya
Context 
Kitengela is an area of about 183 km² located near
the City of Nairobi and the Nairobi National Park
in Kenya. The Nairobi National Park was
established in 1946, covers an area of 117 km², and
is renowned for providing habitat for charismatic
African wildlife at the periphery of a large capital
city. The Kitengela area has long served as a
livestock grazing area for Maasai pastoralists, a
dispersal area for wildlife from the national park,
and a wildlife corridor from the national park to the
Kapiti plains, an area of about 2,200 km² of rolling
grassland to the south of the Nairobi. In 1987, the
group of Maasai, who jointly owned the area as a
Group Ranch, decided to subdivide the land into
designated plots with individual land titles.
Landowners responded by further subdividing the
land, selling small plots for housing, and
establishing fences to demarcate boundaries. Some
areas have been converted from grassland to crops,
timber production, and commercial horticulture.
Human–wildlife conflicts have intensified, and the
numbers of large herbivores in both the park and the
Kitengela area have declined. The Wildlife Lease
Programme was developed as a means of resolving
those conflicts by providing farmers with incentives
to reduce barriers to grazing and movement of
wildlife (Gichohi 2003, http://www.reto-o-reto.org/
sites.php?page=kitengela).
Scoping and negotiation
The Wildlife Conservation Lease (WCL) Program
was initiated in the year 2000 by the Friends of
Nairobi National Park, a group of active individuals
concerned about the future of the Nairobi National
Park and the Nairobi–Kapiti ecosystem. The WCL
is implemented by a Kenyan nongovernmental
organization, The Wildlife Foundation (TWF). The
payment and institutional structure for the WCL was
informed by economic and ecological research
undertaken by the Africa Conservation Centre and
the International Livestock Research Institute
(ILRI). ILRI estimated that the average revenue
from grazing is $8/ha/year, whereas the opportunity
cost of foregone grazing is $4/ha/year. ILRI and
several universities continue to provide technical
support to the WCL through the Reto-o-Reto project
(www.reto-o-reto.org). Landowners in the area
have formed the Kitengela Iparakuo Landowner
Association, which facilitates negotiations with
external bodies and internal negotiations among
landowners.
Implementation 
In return for agreeing not to fence, quarry, cultivate,
or subdivide the designated area of land, and to
actively manage their land for wildlife and
sustainable livestock grazing, TWF pays a fee of
approximately $4/ha/year directly to individual
landowners. The number of farmers enrolled in the
program was 18 in 2000, 65 in 2001, 99 in 2002,
about 117 from 2003 to 2007, and 148 in 2008. The
average participating household earns $400-800/
year, paid in three payments per year, with payments
timed to match the time when school fees are due
to be paid. Funds are generated through donations
from development agencies, the Friends of Nairobi
Park, conservation organizations, the Kenya
Wildlife Service, and private businesses operating
in the Nairobi area.
TWF has adopted a multidimensional approach to
encourage farmers to maintain the wildlife habitat
value of their land. This includes creating awareness
of the disadvantages of subdivision and sale of land
and government regulations governing wildlife.
Conditions determining origin and function
 
1. Kenya has a global reputation for its wildlife
resources, with the maintenance of Nairobi
Park representing commitment to maintain
those resources.
 
2. Individual landowners in the Kitengela area
have freehold title to their land and are free
to opt in or out of the WCL. Being involved
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in the program means allowing wild animals
free access to rangeland, a situation long
familiar to the Maasai.
 
3. The WCL is consistent with Kenya's Wildlife
legislation, although it is seen as a novel and
pathbreaking application of the law.
 
4. Research is seen as instrumental for laying
and maintaining the foundations for the
WCL.
 
5. Emphasis is put on transparency of the
payment mechanism.
Case Study 4: Agroforestry incentives through
voluntary carbon payments in Uganda
Context 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol makes some provision for
afforestation and reforestation projects to generate
tradeable carbon credits through carbon sequestration.
To date, however, the stringent requirements of the
CDM have meant that only one or two afforestation/
reforestation projects have been registered by the
CDM anywhere in the world. Nonetheless, there has
been considerable experimentation with small-scale
carbon sequestration projects, with the carbon sold
on voluntary carbon markets. One such project has
been implemented in the Bushenyi District in
southwest Uganda (Biryahwaho 2006; Jindal et al.
2008).
Scoping and negotiation 
The project in Bushenyi has been led by the
environmental foundation Ecotrust and implemented
by over 100 local farmers. The project began with
a pilot phase in 2003; by 2006, about 40 farmers had
received payments for tree planting. Ecotrust has
been coordinating the project, developing and
maintaining a project-scale database, raising funds,
issuing certificates, and administering payments,
contracting, documenting, and conducting monitoring
and evaluations. The Edinburgh Centre for Carbon
Management and the Plan Vivo Foundation
developed the modus operandi for the project, based
on previous experience in Mexico with a similar
"Plan Vivo" project, and has helped to market the
voluntary carbon credits. The World Agroforestry
Centre (ICRAF) developed technical specifications
for the tree planting regime. The pilot phase of the
project is now being audited by the Rainforest
Alliance for compliance with the Plan Vivo
Standards, and a larger implementation phase is
being planned.
Conditions determining origin and function
 
1. Development of the Bushenyi project
required considerable upfront and ongoing
investment by external agencies with
technical experience in tree management,
practical experience in the design and
implementation of agroforestry projects, and
connections to the voluntary carbon market.
 
2. The voluntary carbon market has proven to
be much more accessible for smallholder
carbon projects than the afforestation/
reforestation window of the CDM.
 
3. Secure land and tree tenure was considered
as a necessary condition for the individual-
level carbon contracts to be negotiated.
Case Study 5: South Africa's "Working for
Water" program
Context 
Nearly 9,000 plant species have been introduced to
South Africa over the past 500 years, with 1,000 of
those species becoming naturalized, 200 of which
are invasive. Invasive alien species have become
established on over 100,000 km² of the country's
land area, approximately 10% of the total land area
of the country. Invasive alien species use 7% of the
country's scarce water resources, reduce the ability
to farm, intensify flooding and fires, cause soil
erosion and siltation, and threaten biological
diversity. The Working for Water Program (http://
www.dwaf.gov.za/wfw/) was developed to provide
community groups with incentives to remove blocks
of invasive trees from publicly owned land (Khan
2006, Turpie et al. 2008).
Scoping and negotiation 
A strong base of information was developed on the
ecological, hydrologic, social, and economic
impacts of invasive alien species over many years,
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with many of the papers published in the South
African Journal of Science. Research organizations
have also developed and tested physical and
biological control methods for many of the most
problematic species. In the mid-1990s, resource
managers and scientists developed the idea of
Working for Water, a program with the dual
objectives of clearing invasive alien species and
generating rural employment. After inception,
Working for Water was implemented quite quickly,
at least partly because its rural employment aspects
matched the objectives of the new ANC
government. The Minister for Water Affairs was
instrumental in promoting the program.
Implementation
Working for Water clears invasive species from
public, communal, and private land. Contracts are
negotiated between the Department for Water
Affairs and private contractors, who submit tenders
specifying how invasive alien plants in a particular
area are to be treated and the amount of labor that
will be used. Contractor staff must have been
previously unemployed. Landowners benefit from
having the trees cleared from their land and are able
to comply with the Conservation of Agricultural
Resources Act (2005), which seeks to make private
landowners responsible for clearing invasive
species from their own land. In practice, the costs
of land clearance have proven to be prohibitively
high for many private landowners. Investment of
public resources in control of invasive species on
private land is justified on the basis of the argument
that many of the invasions are beyond the control
of individual landowners (Turpie et al. 2008). Given
that many invasive species have important use
values (e.g. food, timber), it can be argued that
invasive species control is a mixed public–private
good, with the public component being positive and
the private component being either negative or
positive.
Working for Water is administered through the
South African Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry, working in partnership with local
communities, national and provincial government
departments responsible for environment, tourism,
agriculture, trade and industry, research organizations,
and private companies. Since its inception, Working
for Water has cleared invasive alien plants from
more than 10,000 km² (10% of the degraded area),
each year providing jobs and training to
approximately 20,000 people. They currently run
over 300 projects in all nine of South Africa's
provinces. Funds are generated through South
Africa's poverty relief program, public works
program, the Department for Water Affairs, and
through water resource management fees levied by
municipal water companies. Some local authorities
have also financed the implementation of Working
for Water in their jurisdictions. Since 2002, the
annual budget for Working for Water has been in
the order of 400 million Rand, roughly equivalent
to US$50 million.
Conditions determining origin and function
 
1. Clear demonstration of an environmental
problem worthy of national-level government
involvement, with specific action concentrated
in areas of greatest need and where local
governments are willing to contribute
finance.
 
2. Working for Water simultaneously addresses
three national priorities: environmental
management, rural employment generation,
and poverty reduction.
 
3. The Government of South Africa considers
water to be a national resource and has
sophisticated infrastructure for moving it
around the country. Reducing water waste, as
is achieved by the Working for Water
program, is thus seen as a national-level issue.
 
4. Maintenance of a research capacity in control
methods, hydrology, ecology, economics,
and social science, with research results used
to update and revise the program.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper brings theory and case study evidence
together to identify conditions for the origin and
implementation of effective mechanisms of CRES
in less-developed countries. Here, we seek to draw
conclusions by asking the following question:
"Which of the hypotheses were refuted or failed to
be refuted by the evidence?"
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 focus on three demand-side
characteristics—technology, scarcity, market opportunity
—that can stimulate new demand for CRES
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mechanisms. The case studies provided some
evidence of demand increase due to scarcity,
particularly in the water supply and invasive species
cases. Mechanisms of compensation and reward for
watershed services are generally quite specific to
the circumstances of particular watersheds; the
inter-basin water transfer that occurs in South Africa
makes water supply more of a national issue. Market
opportunity explains the development of the
smallholder carbon case, but does not explain why
project proponents choose particular countries or
areas. We found little evidence of new technology
driving the formation of CRES mechanisms,
although the availability of appropriate methods for
invasive species control was featured in the
Working for Water case. More important across all
of the cases was a different demand-side element:
the availability of credible information about the
environmental service problem and solutions to the
problem. In practice, all four of the demand-side
characteristics—scarcity, technology, market opportunity,
and information—interact together to shape
demand for CRES mechanisms.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 focus more on the institutional
supply and political economy of CRES
mechanisms. From the case studies, it appears
CRES is still a relatively new area for policy making
in most of the developing world, with relatively little
formation of interest groups of proponents or
opponents. Civil society dialogue and concern is
perhaps most advanced in parts of Latin America
and India. International networks, donor agencies,
and research organizations are still very important
for the establishment and continued functioning of
many of the CRES mechanisms in place.
Some of the case study evidence is consistent with
the ideas dominant model (H5). That is, countries
that have most consistently embraced security of
property rights, market exchange, and environmental
conservation are most likely to have functional
CRES mechanisms. Countries with weak or failed
systems of property and markets are unlikely to see
the development of robust CRES mechanisms.
Within countries or regions with favorable policy
conditions, the ideas dominant model may explain
the adoption and diffusion of CRES mechanisms.
The case study evidence is not consistent with the
settings dominant model of institutional change
(H6). We find no evidence of CRES mechanisms
developing in response to particular environmental
disasters or government policy failures; instead they
are more likely to develop in response to dramatic
changes in the national institutional context.
Changes in national laws that recognize and
enhance the rights of local landowners were
important to the development of CRES mechanisms
in the Philippines and Costa Rica. In South Africa,
the formulation of Working for Water was shaped
by the dramatic change in governance and the high
priority placed on rural employment generation.
These experiences are more consistent with the
chaos dominant model (H7).
Many of the case studies presented have been and
continue to be supported by a number of multilateral
agreements, international organizations and
research–policy networks (H8). Because they are
signatories to a range of multilateral environmental
agreements, most developing countries have
established similar institutional foundations for
CRES, despite very different circumstances of
scarcity and threats to their ecosystems.
Environmental laws in many developing countries
are best understood as framework laws that provide
scope for CRES mechanisms. Successful case
studies can provide the specific content and
operational procedures for those framework laws.
Research, monitoring, and evaluation are important
to justify the establishment, implementation, and
continued operation of public CRES mechanisms.
This is particularly important for mechanisms
involving larger areas and involving relatively
complex cause–effect relationships.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art6/responses/
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